Christmas in Bastogne

After landing troops on the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944, the American, British, and Canadian Allies pushed east toward their objective: the German heartland. By November, the advance had slowed to a crawl due to German resistance and the logistics of supporting the Allies’ battle line, which extended north and south from Holland to Switzerland for 100 miles.

While the Germans were fighting the Russians on a broad front in the east, they possessed an advantage on the western front in the winter of 1944 – they were no longer defending all of Western Europe. Their front lines in the west had considerably shortened and were much closer to the German heartland. As the German army fell back, their logistics grew less complex, despite the fact that the Allies controlled the air. Additionally, their extensive homeland telephone and telegraph network meant that radios were less needed for communications, which reduced the volume of ULTRA intercepts –.the Allies access to German coded radio traffic.

Notwithstanding the imbalance in fighting strength – the Allies had 96 divisions at or near the front while the Germans had 55 – after a September briefing on the status of the western front, Hitler decided that Germany would launch an ambitious winter counteroffensive in the Ardennes – the vast Belgian forest that separated the American and German lines. It was so dense that a person could easily become lost and vehicles could not operate in it. This forced traffic onto the few roads that traversed the Ardennes, making them and the villages through which roads ran strategic objectives in Hitler’s counteroffensive. Therefore, anyone who could read a map quickly recognized the strategic importance of two Belgian towns currently in the hands of the Americans. St. Vith, which sat at the intersection of six roads, and Bastogne, at the intersection of eight roads.

The offensive would crash through the Ardennes, as was done in 1940 when the German army surprised and defeated France in days. In 1940, however, German troops had passed through the Ardennes in three days before engaging the enemy, but the 1944 plan called for a battle in the forest. The coup de main was to advance westward to the Meuse River, then turn northwest for Antwerp and Brussels. The close terrain of the Ardennes would make rapid movement difficult, though open ground beyond the Meuse offered the prospect of a successful dash to the coast.

For the offensive to be successful, four criteria were critical: (i) the attack had to be a complete surprise; (ii) the weather conditions had to be poor to neutralize Allied air superiority and the damage it could inflict on the German offensive and its supply lines; (iii) the progress had to be rapid – the Meuse River, halfway to Antwerp, had to be reached by D +4; and (iv) allied fuel supplies would have to be captured intact along the way because the Wehrmacht was short on fuel. The German General Staff estimated they only had enough fuel to cover one-third to one-half of the ground to Antwerp in heavy combat conditions.

Hitler laid out a plan to attack the Allied lines in Belgium with 38 divisions. Despite major misgivings from his senior commanders, Hitler would not yield on his plan and the jump-off date was set at December 16, 1944. It would be an unexpected stroke against the Allies.

Allied commanders considered the Ardennes area to be unsuitable for a large-scale German attack because of its almost impenetrable terrain, and certainly no surprise attack through this hostile region was thought likely given the current horrendous weather conditions – rain, snow, sleet and ice – which would later prove to be the worst weather in recorded history. Moreover, none of the ULTRA intelligence reports suggested that combat-ready German divisions were stationed in the area; only those in need of rest and refitting were believed to be facing the Ardennes. What little intelligence they had led the Allies to believe precisely what the Germans wanted them to believe – that the German preparations being carried out were only for defensive, not offensive operations. Bastogne, therefore, was only defended by a US Army division that had seen continuous fighting almost since D-Day and was assigned to this sector of the battle line because it was unlikely to see action. Mixed in were various other units whose troops and officers had seen no combat thus far in the war.

At 5:30 a.m. on Saturday, December 16, 1944, the Germans began the assault with a massive, 90-minute artillery barrage using 1,600 artillery pieces across an 80 miles front on the Allied troops facing the Sixth SS Panzer Army. History would remember this as the Battle of the Bulge. The temperature in Bastogne on that day was 14 degrees Fahrenheit. Poorly equipped American forces would suffer greatly while German forces, drawing on years of experience of fighting the Russians, were equipped with warm and practical clothing.

Heavy snowstorms engulfed parts of the Ardennes area. While having the desired effect of keeping the Allied aircraft grounded, the weather also proved nettlesome for the Germans because poor road conditions hampered their advance. Ineffective traffic management and snow drifts several feet deep led to massive traffic jams, and fuel shortages plagued the forward German units.

American soldiers found their rifles jammed constantly in the frozen air. They had to urinate on them to free their mechanisms. A biting wind sliced through their wet uniforms. Many suffered frostbite. A heavy fog hung over much of the Ardennes region. Tanks moved at a crawl and half-tracks ground to a halt in the thick mud. On that December in 1944 American combat troops were not dreaming of a white Christmas; they got the real thing and hated it.

Eisenhower and his principal commanders quickly realized that the ferocity of the German attack signaled a major offensive, not a local counterattack, so they ordered vast reinforcements into the breakout area. Within a week, 250,000 Allied troops streamed to the front. Eisenhower personally ordered the 101st to the Bastogne crossroads with instructions to hold at all cost. Advance elements of the 101st rushed to Bastogne and began entering the town in trucks on the morning of the 19th. Hitler’s troops would have to dislodge them or face a counterattack and a likely defeat. Still, the early prospects were daunting for the Americans.

In 1944 Bastogne was a market town located on a 1,600-foot plateau overlooking the surrounding Ardennes. Its wartime population was a bit over 4,000 – dwarfed by the 10,000 American soldiers now deployed in the village and the several surrounding outposts in nearby hamlets. Major General Troy Middleton was the VIII Corps commander in charge of the battle sector that included Bastogne. “Now don’t get yourself surrounded,” Middleton had warned Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe, the acting commander of the 101st.

On the Saturday of the German breakout, things were normal in Bastogne – the shops and markets were open on the Grand Rue and they were doing a bustling business. The next day, Sunday, refugees began streaming in from the east indicating that something unusual was afoot. Around noon, the electricity went out all over town – not an unusual occurrence for the town. But on the morning of the third day, Monday December 18th, artillery could be heard off in the eastern distance and American stragglers began entering the town. By midday, civilians were leaving, pushing carts heaped high with possessions. Those who stayed moved into their cellars for safety from the bombardment they expected would come. One of those who stayed was Renée Lemaire, a beautiful 30-year old with blue eyes and a cascade of brown hair. Renée had trained for four years at a hospital in Brussels to become a nurse. She would be invaluable in the days ahead.

On the evening of Tuesday, December 19, German reconnaissance units began colliding with the American outposts surrounding Bastogne. Furious fire fights broke out but the outposts, supported by other units of the 101st in Bastogne, continued to hold, forcing the Panzer columns to swing past them on the north and south, and move around to the west. The Germans succeeded in closing a ring of steel around Bastogne on Wednesday the 20th, completely cutting off the town from the American battle line.

Over the next several days the Germans threw everything they could at the American pocket of resistance, hoping to puncture it. On December 21 the German unit Kampfgruppe Kunkel launched a fierce assault against an outpost in a hamlet west of Bastogne but was repulsed. The Germans tried again four times on the following day, Friday the 22nd, to no avail. Withstanding similar attacks on outposts south of town, the 101st held, supported by the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions that barely made it into Bastogne before it was surrounded. Attacks on the village caused its situation to deteriorate quickly as ammunition dwindled, gasoline ran low, and medical supplies ran out. Food was scarce, and by December 22 artillery ammunition had to be restricted to 10 rounds per gun per day. Temperatures fell below zero, and overcast skies prevented supplies from being dropped into the city and prevented fighters from attacking German positions. But morale remained high, and the perimeter around Bastogne still held.

By nightfall on the 22nd, the rough outline of a fighting perimeter had formed, and Bastogne became a “hole in the doughnut” as one officer called it. All aid stations had been converted to hospitals since evacuation of the wounded was impossible. Exhausted army surgeons shook their heads in frustration as men died who would otherwise have been saved with better care and facilities. Renée Lemaire pitched in to help as a nurse, caring for over a hundred patients, many of whom had no beds and lay on blankets on the floor.

The Germans had clearly underestimated the American resolve. Around noon on the 22nd, therefore, two German officers and two enlisted men walked up a snow-covered road under a white flag of truce to an astonished Army check point. The Germans carried an ultimatum from their commander in the sector, General von Luttwitz. It insisted that there “was only one possibility to save the encircled American troops from total annihilation: that is, the honorable surrender of the encircled town.” It gave their commander two hours to consent or German guns would “annihilate” the US forces and level Bastogne.

An American officer delivered the note to General McAuliffe and his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ned Moore, who read it out loud. McAuliffe’s first reaction was to utter, in sheer disgust, “Aw, nuts.” After discussing the situation with his staff, everyone agreed that McAuliffe’s initial outburst was the ideal response to the German demand, and the general wrote out a formal reply. In words that have since become legendary. The note said, “To the German Commander: NUTS! From the American Commander.”

A regimental commander visiting McAuliffe’s headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Harper, insisted on taking the reply personally to the Germans. Even though the German Lieutenant representing General von Luttwitz had spent years in the import business and spoke fluent English, he could only translate the reply literally to the other officer in the party. “Nuts” perplexed both. “Is the reply negative or affirmative?” the Lieutenant politely asked. LTC Harper, trenchantly translated the colloquialism for the Germans: in plain English. “The reply is decidedly not affirmative, and if you continue this foolish attack, your losses will be tremendous.”

"If you don’t understand what ‘Nuts’ means,” continued Harper, “it is the same as ‘Go to Hell!’ and I will tell you something else; if you continue to attack, we will kill every goddamned German that tries to break into this city.” The German officers snapped to attention, saluted, and said, “We will kill many Americans. This is war.”

“On your way, Bud,” snorted Harper.

Over the next several days in the face of unrelenting German assaults, the Americans held on often by their frostbitten finger tips. But the sky cleared on December 24, allowing air drops of ammunition, food and medical equipment. Christmas in Bastogne had arrived a day early in the form of more than 150 American cargo planes that flew the drop missions, dipping and diving to evade anti-aircraft fire from the German batteries, with several crash-landing inside the American zone.

General McAuliffe’s message to his troops on Christmas Eve is recorded in many accounts of the battle:

“What’s merry about all this, you ask? Just this: We have stopped cold everything that has been thrown at us from the North, East, South and West. We have identifications from four German Panzer divisions and one German parachute division. The Germans surround us, their radios blare our doom. Their commander demanded our surrender, and received the following reply…‘NUTS!’ We are giving our country and our loved ones at home a worthy Christmas present, and, being privileged to take part in this gallant feat of arms, are truly making for ourselves a Merry Christmas.”

The men at the front were not as upbeat as McAuliffe. They had cold white beans for their Christmas Eve dinner. Captain Dick Winters, who became somewhat famous as a result of the Band of Brothers television series, remembered that “dinner that night consisted of five white beans and a cup of cold broth.” Out on icy line, Sergeant Robert Rader and Private Don Hoobler, both from the same town in the Midwest, sat in their frigid foxholes. Rader said, “As the night wore on we talked of our homes, our families, and how they were spending their Christmas Eve. Hoobler felt sure all of them were in church praying for us.” They probably were, and that was a good thing. The Luftwaffe viciously bombed Bastogne that night, causing extensive damage and killing numerous civilians and American soldiers. A German bomb fell through the roof of an aid station and exploded inside killing 30 people. One of them was Renée Lemaire.

There was no let up on Christmas Day. Hitler had demanded that the town be taken immediately. The Germans let loose several armored attacks against the Bastogne pocket. Once again they were driven back, with heavy losses. Inside the town some soldiers attended religious services. Others tended to the wounded, or buried the dead. Most were outside, holding the perimeter.

On December 19, Eisenhower had met with his key commanders in Verdun. Knowing the plight of the 101st in Bastogne, he asked if anyone could get up there and relieve them. Patton said he could attack with three divisions. “When can you start?” Ike asked. “In 36 hours,” Patton replied.

Christmas in Bastogne arrived on December 26, when an armored column from Patton’s 3rd Army pierced the German cordon around the city. The next day it rolled up into the center of Bastogne. It had traveled over 150 miles in six days, fighting pitched battles and tank engagements along the way.

With the arrival of Patton’s armored divisions, the Bastogne siege was over. On December 29 troops of the 101st Airborne Division unleashed a counterattack against the Germans on the edge of town.

The failure to take Bastogne essentially ended the Battle of the Bulge. It had been the bloodiest of the battles the US forces experienced in World War II; one in which the 19,000 American dead were unsurpassed by those of any other engagement. A total of 17 Medals of Honor were awarded, seven of them posthumously.

The official casualty figures for the campaign from German High Command were 84,834, although unofficial estimates range between 60,000 and 100,000. German losses in the battle were critical in several other respects. The last of the German reserves were now gone, the Luftwaffe had been shattered, and the remaining German forces in the West were being pushed back to the defenses of the Siegfried Line.

This was the last Christmas of the war.

On April 30, 1945 Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin bunker.

General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command, signed the Allies’ unconditional surrender documents for all German forces on May 7, 1945.

The Day of Infamy

At 30 minutes past noon on December 8, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt began an address to a Joint Session on Congress:

“Yesterday, December 7, 1941 -- a date which will live in infamy -- the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.”

A Japanese task force of six aircraft carriers had slipped its moorings in the home islands on November 26, 1941 and sailed to an attack staging point northwest of Hawaii. The attack employed 360 planes in two waves – the first wave focused on the American fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor while the second destroyed parked aircraft to prevent their mounting a retaliatory attack.

At 7:53 a.m. Hawaii Time the slow torpedo bombers arrived over target and commenced the attack on Battleship Row anchored at Ford Island.

The USS Raleigh was the first ship hit. After receiving six torpedo hits, the USS West Virginia quickly sank.

The Utah, an ancient battleship converted to a target ship, was bombed and torpedoed. Rolling over, she snapped her mooring lines and settled on her outboard side. Sailors trapped inside began banging on the hull, and many who had escaped the Utah went back to rescue them. Since the trapped sailors were in an air pocket near the keel, a welder had to sit on the bottom of the hull under Japanese strafing fire to burn two escape holes.

On the other side of Ford Island, the Oklahoma, bombed and torpedoed, heeled over and sank.

At 8:10 a.m. an armor-piercing bomb fell between the No. 1 and No. 2 turrets of the Arizona, exploding the forward magazine. The explosion ripped open the ship like a tin can igniting a fire that swept the entire ship, cremating many of its sailors. Within minutes the Arizona sank to the bottom taking 1,300 lives with her.

Dive bombers and fighters tore up Hickam Field and Wheeler Field, the main air bases on Oahu. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and went on to attack Ford Island.

Ninety minutes after the attack began, it was over. The toll was staggering – 2,386 Americans were killed, including 55 civilians who died from unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas. Among the wounded were 1,139 civilians.

Eighteen ships, including five battleships, were sunk or run aground in their escape.

Of 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged, 155 of which never got off the ground. Almost no aircraft were in a state of readiness that would have allowed them to take off and defend the base. Twenty-four out of 33 PBYs were destroyed, and six others were damaged beyond repair. Panicky friendly fire on the ground shot down some airborne American planes, among them five inbound from the carrier Enterprise which was at sea with the carriers Lexington and Saratoga.

Troops caught in barracks and bunks were mostly killed by Japanese fighter aircraft.

Only 55 Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. One Japanese submariner was captured. Of Japan's 414 planes engaged in the attack, only 29 were lost during the battle.

The American servicemen who distinguished themselves in the attack on Pearl Harbor received 16 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, 53 Silver Crosses, four Navy and Marine Corps Medals, one Distinguished Flying Cross, four Distinguished Service Crosses, one Distinguished Service Medal, and three Bronze Stars – a measure of the valor shown that day.

Work began immediately on ships that could be refloated and repaired, a task that required 20,000 hours of underwater work by divers. Within six months, five battleships and two cruisers were patched well enough to tow them to mainland shipyards for extensive repair.

The Oklahoma was raised but never repaired. The Utah and Arizona were so badly damaged that they were left where they sank and are visible today. The Arizona would become a permanent memorial and the tomb of the sailors who died on it that day. It remains a ship of the line and its flag is raised every day, but only to half-mast.

It would be May 17, 1942 before the West Virginia would be pumped out. During its repairs, the bodies of 70 crewmen were found as well as a calendar that had days scratched off. The last date scratched off was December 23 1941 – 16 days after the attack.

As bad as things were, they could have been worse.

America’s three aircraft carriers – the Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise – were untouched by the Japanese attack because they were at sea and the attackers did not look for them. Had they been taken out of action, the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations against the Japanese would have been crippled for at least a year.

Since the attack had taken the battleships out of action for some time – the intent of the Japanese was to destroy them – the US Navy had no choice but to change strategy and emphasize carriers and submarines over battleships, something it had not done in its pre-war planning. Navy doctrine heretofore had been heavily influenced by the theories of Captain (later Admiral) Alfred Mahan who lived before the era of carriers. He contended that the decisive battles in war would be won at sea by battleships. Battleships, therefore, became the capital ships of the American Navy and consequently were the targets of the Japanese attack. The attackers had also read Captain Mahan’s writings.

Why did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor?

War between Japan and the US had been considered a possibility since the 1920s, although real tension did not begin until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. During the decade that followed, Japan expanded into China, leading to all out war between the two countries in 1937. In 1940 Japan pushed forward and invaded French Indochina (modern day Vietnam). The attack on the American installations at Pearl Harbor was part of the Japanese grand strategy to block the US Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl from taking action against Japan’s next conquest into Southeast Asia against Britain, the Netherlands, and the US presence in the Philippines.

Planning for the attack began early in 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander in chief of Japan's combined fleet. It was Yamamoto's duty to carry out Japan’s plan to rule the Pacific. He did not believe that Japan could win a sustained war with the US, but if it could knock out the strength of the US fleet, the balance of power in the Pacific would shift.

The true genius behind the strategy for the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, was Commander Minuru Genda. He may have been the most brilliant officer, Japanese or American, that took part in the Pacific Campaign. Genda believed the task would be "difficult, but not impossible" and began working on the details of a plan that employed six Japanese carriers in an overpowering air strike.

Captain Mitsuo Fuchida was responsible for the coordination of the entire aerial attack. He led the first wave to its targets. Once the operation was underway, Fuchida and Genda became the subordinate officers of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the senior commander of the attack fleet.

Yamamoto insisted on compliance with the conventions of war and demanded that Japan declare war on the US at least 30 minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor commenced. Japanese diplomats tried to uphold these conventions, but the attack nevertheless began before the notice was delivered. The reason? Tokyo had cabled a 5,000-word notification to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, but transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese Ambassador to deliver in time. In fact, US code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before the Japanese Ambassador was scheduled to deliver it.

Because of the delay in notifying the American government, the Pearl Harbor attack became a strategic blunder in Yamamo’s mind, even though both he and Genda wanted a surprise attack. While his staff members were celebrating its victory, Yamamoto spent the day after Pearl Harbor "sunk in apparent depression." Upset that the bungling of the Japanese Foreign Ministry allowed the attack to happen while their countries were technically at peace, Yamamoto quickly realized American citizens would be enraged and said prophetically, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."

With considerable accuracy, American war planners had assessed how the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, but they believed war would be declared first before any attack was launched. There was, however, a general sentiment that the Japanese would be foolish to attack an American territory and certainly "the most impregnable fortress in the world" – Pearl Harbor.

The American counterparts of the Japanese commanders were Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the US Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor, and Lt. General Walter C. Short, the commander of the army base charged with the protection of Oahu. If one were to look at the training the Japanese troops underwent in preparation for Pearl Harbor supervised by Genda, Fuchido, and Nagumo, and the training that took place under Kimmel and Short, knowing as they did how high the tensions between the US and Japan were, one would find the American commanders severely lacking.

Kimmel and Short, however, were ignorant of vital intelligence that might have made a difference in their preparation. Fearing that it could reveal that cryptographers had broken the Japanese code and were routinely reading their cable traffic, Washington did not pass on information to Kimmel and Short that there was a strong likelihood of an imminent attack.

During a later naval inquiry of the attack in 1944, a cryptographer testified that:

“On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States ...”

“On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and … at 9:00 p.m. December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military [US Army] Intelligence at this same time. Finally at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941 [about 5:00 a.m. Hawaii time], we received positive information ... that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) that date.”

All decoded messages, the cryptographer testified, were promptly passed on to the President and other key civilian and military personnel. Yet both Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark about the most pertinent of these messages.

Blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster, therefore, can be laid everywhere from Washington to the Hawaiian department. The Roberts Commission put most of the blame on Kimmel and Short, citing dereliction of duty and errors in judgment on their part. Both officers got their day in court, but it did not go well for them. While all blame for Pearl Harbor could not be squarely placed on their shoulders, none would be placed on Washington.

Admiral Kimmel lost one of his four stars and was relieved of command. Until his death in 1968, he worked to clear his name, an effort taken up by others after his death, including his son and grandson. Attempts to restore his rank as a four-star Admiral were rejected by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton.

General Short also lost a star, retired from the Army 14 months after Pearl Harbor, and took a job at a Ford Motor Company plant in Dallas, Texas. He lived to see the end of the war but died in 1949 of a chronic heart ailment.

The results the Japanese later achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as they achieved at Pearl Harbor, although General Douglas MacArthur, the commander in the Philippines, had been given almost nine hours’ warning that the Japanese had attacked Pearl, and he was given specific orders to prepare before a follow up attack could strike his command. MacArthur did nothing. His inaction resulted in the loss of US air power in the western Pacific, forcing the complete withdrawal of the US fleet from Philippine waters and allowing the Japanese invasion of the mainland. He was never censured, relieved of command, or reduced in rank.

In order to boost morale following the Japanese defeat at Guadalcanal, Admiral Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour of Japanese defense bases throughout the southwestern Pacific. On April 14, 1943, US naval intelligence decrypted a message containing Yamamoto’s specific itinerary – complete with arrival and departure times and locations – as well as the number and types of planes that would transport and protect him. Yamamoto was killed on the morning of April 18, 1943 near Bougainville when his aircraft was shot down in an ambush by American P-38 fighter planes. His death was a major blow to Japanese military and homeland morale.

After leading the fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nagumo went on to lead it in the Battle of Midway where his luck ran out. American code-breakers enabled his Midway attack to be ambushed. He lost four carriers and most of their air crews. It would prove to be the turning point of the Pacific Campaign. When it was apparent that his defense of Saipan against the American attack was doomed, Nagumo committed suicide on July 6, 1944.

The military career of Yamamoto’s brilliant subordinate, Minuru Genda, who had planned the Pearl Harbor attack, came to an end when the Imperial Japanese Navy was dissolved. He returned to active duty in 1954 as a member of the newly-established Japan Air Self-Defense Force, eventually rising to the rank of general and later the chief of staff. After retiring from the postwar military in 1962, he was elected to the upper house of Japan's legislature. Genda died on August 15, 1989, exactly 44 years to the day after the Japanese surrender in World War II, and just one day short of his 85th birthday

Mitsuo Fuchida, the leader of the air attack on Pearl Harbor, became a Christian and an evangelist preacher after the war. Among several books that he wrote in the postwar years was From Pearl Harbor to Calvary, the biographical story of his conversion. In 1960, he became an American citizen. Fuchida died in 1976.

This week, Tuesday December 7 will pass almost unnoticed by the current generation of Americans, as it usually does. It will be the 69th anniversary of the Day of Infamy.


Post script: After 30 years of researching the Pearl Harbor attack and interviewing the principal survivors, Gordon W. Prange published the seminal work on the event: At Dawn We Slept. From it was produced the 1970 film Tora! Tora Tora!, whose title comes from the code-words used by the Japanese to indicate that complete surprise was achieved. Tora means tiger in Japanese.